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A SLAP ON THE WRIST: COMBATTING 
RUSSIA’S CYBER ATTACK ON THE 2016  
U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
Abstract: On June 14, 2016, suspicions emerged that Russia launched a cyber 
attack on the U.S. Democratic National Committee in the midst of an ex-
tremely contentious presidential election season. The damage was extensive, 
occurring over a series of months and resulting in numerous leaks of highly 
sensitive information regarding Democratic Presidential Candidate Hillary 
Clinton. After it was verified that Russia was behind the cyber attack, Presi-
dent Barack Obama relied on general and anachronistic principles of interna-
tional law to issue a grossly ineffective response. Russia’s cyber attack and the 
U.S. response thus highlighted the ways in which international law fails to 
guard against and remedy state-sponsored cyber attacks. These attacks will 
continue to occur at an alarming rate and without adequate recourse unless a 
new international treaty is implemented. In order to be successful, this treaty 
would need to garner the support of the major cyber powers and be specifical-
ly tailored towards combatting state-sponsored cyber attacks. 
INTRODUCTION 
The 2016 U.S. presidential election was highly contentious from the 
start.1 Americans were deeply divided over the issues, even within the Re-
publican and Democratic parties.2 A lot was at stake: the next President 
would have the power to shape the Supreme Court, decide the future of 
Obamacare, and transform immigration policies.3 Republican candidate 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See, e.g., Joshua Green, Why 2016 May Be the Most Important Election of Our Lifetime, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 5, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-11-
05/why-2016-may-be-the-most-important-election-of-our-lifetime [http://perma.cc/B5K9-JPSM] 
(recognizing that “the chasm” between the Republican and Democratic parties was “the greatest 
it’s ever been”); Danielle Kurtzleben, The Most ‘Unprecedented’ Election Ever? 65 Ways It Has 
Been, NPR (July 3, 2016), http://www.npr.org/2016/07/03/484214413/the-most-unprecedented-
election-ever-65-ways-it-has-been [http://perma.cc/86BJ-JJZU] (listing the ways in which the 
2016 presidential election was “unprecedented”). 
 2 William A. Galston, Republicans and Democrats Divided on Important Issues for a Presiden-
tial Nominee, BROOKINGS (June 3, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2015/06/03/
republicans-and-democrats-divided-on-important-issues-for-a-presidential-nominee/ [http://perma.cc/
VAQ9-VKMQ]; Green, supra note 1. 
 3 See Green, supra note 1 (stating that Democratic and Republican presidential candidates point 
the country towards entirely different futures in regards to the Affordable Care Act, the make-up of 
the Supreme Court, and immigration policies); Bradley Klapper et al., Why It Matters: Issues at Stake 
in Election, U.S. NEWS (Sept. 17, 2016), https://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2016-09-17/
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Donald Trump and Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton appealed to the 
many voters who were angry and frustrated with the status quo, thereby se-
curing their party’s presidential nomination in a bitterly fought primary 
election.4 Both candidates only grew more extreme in their views and 
shrouded in controversy as Election Day neared and, in fact, were deemed 
the two most disliked presidential candidates in nearly forty years.5 Once it 
seemed as though the election could not possibly create more media head-
lines, suspicions emerged that Russia hacked the Democratic National 
Committee (“DNC”).6 
The DNC reported a breach of its computer network on June 14, 2016, 
which was quickly attributed to Russian hackers.7 The devastating fallout 
occurred in waves beginning on July 22, 2016 when WikiLeaks published 
nearly twenty thousand e-mails and eight thousand attachments from top 
DNC officials.8 The hackers continued to leak massive amounts of sensitive 
                                                                                                                           
why-it-matters-issues-at-stake-in-election [http://perma.cc/TZ65-L7R8] (describing the Democratic 
and Republican stance on major issues such as immigration and health care). 
 4 Caitlin Huey-Burns, Angry Voters: Who Will They Support?, REALCLEARPOLITICS (Jan. 12, 
2016), http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2016/01/12/angry_voters_who_will_they_support.
html [http://perma.cc/SD2J-QRRQ]; Maria Liasson, Here’s Why Voters Are So Anxious This Elec-
tion, NPR (Jan. 25, 2016), http://www.npr.org/2016/01/25/464217330/heres-why-voters-are-so-
anxious-this-election [http://perma.cc/Z2NB-REFF]. 
 5 Eliza Collins, Poll: Clinton, Trump Most Unfavorable Candidates Ever, USA TODAY (Aug. 
31, 2016), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/onpolitics/2016/08/31/poll-clinton-trump-
most-unfavorable-candidates-ever/89644296/ [http://perma.cc/N64U-XX3V]; Harry Enten, Ameri-
cans’ Distaste for Both Trump and Clinton Is Record-Breaking, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (May 5, 2016), 
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/americans-distaste-for-both-trump-and-clinton-is-record-breaking/ 
[http://perma.cc/XQ2T-5FJC]. 
 6 Justin Fishel & Veronica Stracqualursi, A Timeline of Russia’s Hacking into US Political 
Organizations Before the Election, ABC NEWS (Dec. 15, 2016), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/
timeline-russias-hacking-us-political-organizations-ahead-election/story?id=44140526 [http://perma.
cc/3DL9-4QC7]; Ellen Nakashima, Russian Government Hackers Penetrated DNC, Stole Opposi-
tion Research on Trump, WASH. POST (June 14, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/russian-government-hackers-penetrated-dnc-stole-opposition-research-on-trump/
2016/06/14/cf006cb4-316e-11e6-8ff7-7b6c1998b7a0_story.html [http://perma.cc/R54P-9LH5]. 
“Hacking” is defined as “deliberately gain[ing] (or attempt[ing] to gain) unauthorized access to 
computer systems.” S.M. Furnell & M.J. Warren, Computer Hacking and Cyber Terrorism: The 
Real Threats in the New Millennium?, 18 COMPUTERS & SECURITY 28, 29 (1999). The Democrat-
ic National Committee (“DNC”) is an organization responsible for raising money, hiring staff, and 
coordinating strategies to assist Democratic candidates. The Democratic National Committee, 
DEMOCRATS, https://www.democrats.org/organization/the-democratic-national-committee [http://
perma.cc/P7J2-MY26]. 
 7 Fishel & Stracqualursi, supra note 6; Eric Lipton et al., The Perfect Weapon: How Russian 
Cyberpower Invaded the U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/13/
us/politics/russia-hack-election-dnc.html [http://perma.cc/6VJZ-CQSK]; Nakashima, supra note 6; 
Dmitri Alperovitch, Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee, 
CROWDSTRIKE BLOG (June 15, 2016), https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-
democratic-national-committee/ [http://perma.cc/3MKY-XT3W]. 
 8 Fishel & Stracqualursi, supra note 6; Tom Hamburger & Karen Tumulty, WikiLeaks Releases 
Thousands of Documents About Clinton and Internal Deliberations, WASH. POST (July 22, 2016), 
2018] Combatting Russia’s Cyber Attack on the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election 2169 
campaign information in the days leading up to the November 7, 2016 U.S. 
presidential election.9 
On October 7, 2016, the U.S. Intelligence Community publicly ex-
pressed confidence that the Russian government was behind the cyber at-
tack on the DNC.10 Then, on December 29, 2016, U.S. President Barack 
Obama issued an Executive Order, taking measures against Russia for per-
petrating the cyber attack.11 Specifically, the order blocked five Russian 
entities and four Russian individuals from engaging in business with the 
United States and seized all of their assets in the United States.12 Obama 
also authorized the U.S. Department of State to declare thirty-five Russian 
                                                                                                                           
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/07/22/on-eve-of-democratic-conven-
tion-wikileaks-releases-thousands-of-documents-about-clinton-the-campaign-and-internal-deliberat-
ions/ [http://perma.cc/MZ3R-QK2R]. WikiLeaks was created in 2006 by Julian Assange as a non-
profit organization for releasing documents obtained from anonymous sources. Jonathan Zittrain & 
Molly Sauter, Everything You Need to Know About Wikileaks, MIT TECH. REV. (Dec. 9, 2010), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/421949/everything-you-need-to-know-about-wikileaks/ [http://
perma.cc/R2WH-9284]. 
 9 Fishel & Stracqualursi, supra note 6; Maggie Haberman & Alan Rappeport, Presidential 
Election: The Day Before the Storm, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/
11/07/us/politics/presidential-election.html [http://perma.cc/66FZ-BQ59]; Katiana Krawchenko et 
al., The John Podesta Emails Released by WikiLeaks, CBS NEWS (Oct. 13, 2016), http://www.cbs
news.com/news/the-john-podesta-emails-released-by-wikileaks/ [http://perma.cc/94WM-Q53F]; 
Michael Sainato, DC Leaks Exposes Clinton Insider’s Elitist and Embarrassing Emails, OBSERVER 
(Oct. 7, 2016), http://observer.com/2016/10/dc-leaks-exposes-clinton-insiders-elitist-and-embarrassing-
emails/ [http://perma.cc/8V6N-3BBE]. 
 10 Fishel & Stracqualursi, supra note 6; Joint Statement from the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity and Office of the Director of National Intelligence on Election Security, DEP’T OF HOMELAND 
SECURITY (Oct. 7, 2016), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2016/10/07/joint-statement-department-
homeland-security-and-office-director-national [http://perma.cc/JW2V-M26Y]. The U.S. Intelli-
gence Community is comprised of seventeen separate organizations including the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Homeland Security, National Se-
curity Agency, and U.S. Army. Member Agencies, THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY INTEL-
LIGENCE CAREERS, https://www.intelligencecareers.gov/icmembers.html [http://perma.cc/G7TC-
QZTR]. 
 11 Exec. Order No. 13,757, 82 Fed. Reg. 1 (Dec. 28, 2016); Lauren Gambino et al., Obama Ex-
pels 35 Russian Diplomats in Retaliation for US Election Hacking, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 30, 2016), 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/dec/29/barack-obama-sanctions-russia-election-hack 
[http://perma.cc/3B75-FSZS]; David E. Sanger, Obama Strikes Back at Russia for Election Hacking, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/29/us/politics/russia-election-
hacking-sanctions.html [http://perma.cc/9HG8-VL68]; Lesley Wroughton, US Expels 35 Russian 
Diplomats, Closes 2 Russian Compounds, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 29, 2016), http://www.business
insider.com/us-expels-35-russian-diplomats-closes-2-russian-compounds-2016-12 [http://perma.cc/
6GHR-DK52]. 
 12 Exec. Order No. 13,757; Gambino et al., supra note 11; Sanger, supra note 11; Press Re-
lease, The White House, Statement by the President on Actions in Response to Russian Malicious 
Cyber Activity and Harassment (Dec. 29, 2016) (on file with the White House Office of the Press 
Secretary). 
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diplomats “persona non grata” and close two Russian compounds on U.S. 
territory.13 
On January 6, 2017, the U.S. Director of National Intelligence released 
its official conclusion that the Russian government was behind the DNC 
hacks.14 Although Russia’s motives for interfering with the election are still 
not entirely clear, the Director of National Intelligence and many others be-
lieve that the hacks were intended to help Donald Trump win the presiden-
cy.15 There was, however, no indication that the Russian government tam-
pered with the voting process itself.16 
This Note examines the legal ramifications of the U.S. response to 
Russia’s cyber attack on the DNC.17 Part I links this attack to the alarming 
rise of state-sponsored hacking aimed at the United States.18 Part II discuss-
es the international law of response, focusing on the provisions relevant to 
the U.S. response to Russia’s cyber attack.19 Lastly, Part III argues that the 
United States was forced to rely on general and outdated international law 
principles when responding to Russia’s cyber attack, emphasizing the need 
for a new international treaty that would guard against state-sponsored 
cyber attacks and punish them effectively when they occur.20 
                                                                                                                           
 13 Gambino et al., supra note 11; Sanger, supra note 11; Press Release, The White House, 
supra note 12; see Exec. Order No. 13,757; infra notes 149–151 and accompanying text (explain-
ing that “persona non grata” means “not acceptable” and its declaration requires the sending state 
to “recall the diplomat concerned or terminate his functions with the mission”). 
 14 OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, NAT’L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, ICA 2017-
01D, ASSESSING RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES AND INTENTIONS IN RECENT US ELECTIONS (2017). The 
U.S. Director of National Intelligence is the head of the U.S. Intelligence Community. Careers at 
ODNI, OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, https://www.dni.gov/index.php/careers/
careers-at-odni [http://perma.cc/3HMS-QCMM]. 
 15 OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, supra note 14; Craig Forcese, The “Hacked” 
US Election: Is International Law Silent, Faced with the Clatter of Cyrillic Keyboards?, JUST SECU-
RITY (Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/35652/hacked-election-international-law-silent-
faced-clatter-cyrillic-keyboards/ [http://perma.cc/636S-WNJ3]; Kathy Gilsinian & Krishnadev Cal-
amur, Did Putin Direct Russian Hacking? And Other Big Questions, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 6, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/01/russian-hacking-trump/510689/ [http://
perma.cc/S49E-C9J8]. There was rampant speculation about Russia’s impetus for interfering with the 
2016 U.S. Presidential Election. Kurt Eichenwald, Why Vladimir Putin’s Russia Is Backing Donald 
Trump, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 4, 2016), http://www.newsweek.com/donald-trump-vladimir-putin-russia-
hillary-clinton-united-states-europe-516895 [http://perma.cc/ZGR3-QMFQ]. For example, some 
claimed that Russia was more concerned with lessening Clinton’s chances of winning because it was 
believed that she improperly interfered with Russian affairs while serving as Secretary of State. Id. 
 16 OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, supra note 14; Forcese, supra note 15; 
Gilsinian & Calamur, supra note 15. 
 17 See infra notes 21–236 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 21–93 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 94–189 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 190–236 and accompanying text. 
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I. THE ESCALATING TREND OF STATE-SPONSORED CYBER  
ATTACKS ON THE UNITED STATES 
In light of the heightened dependence on technology in the digital age, 
it was inevitable that states would add computers to their arsenal.21 Tradi-
tionally, a government sponsoring an attack would send armed nationals 
into enemy territory, potentially placing them in grave danger.22 With the 
advent of technology, however, states are now able to wreak havoc on any 
target without even crossing a border.23 States have already wielded their 
technological capabilities to undermine the infrastructure of countries 
around the world, and Russia’s cyber attack on the DNC was merely the 
latest in an escalating trend of state-sponsored hacking directed at the Unit-
ed States.24 Each of these events elicited a drastically different U.S. re-
                                                                                                                           
 21 Irène Couzigou, The Challenges Posed by Cyber-Attacks to the Law on Self-Defense, in 
SELECT PROCEEDINGS OF THE EUROPEAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 245 (Christina 
Binder et al. eds., 2016); Matthew C. Waxman, Cyber-Attacks and the Use of Force: Back to the 
Future of Article 2(4), 36 YALE J. INT’L L., 421, 422–23 (2011); Daniel D. Brecht, Are Cyber 
Threats the New Terrorism Frontier?, CYBER DEF. MAG., Dec. 2014, at 28; Ian Sherr & Seth 
Rosenblatt, Sony and the Rise of State-Sponsored Hacking, CNET (Dec. 20, 2014), https://www.
cnet.com/news/sony-and-the-rise-of-state-sponsored-hacking/ [http://perma.cc/4BBZ-VL8C]. 
 22 Brecht, supra note 21; Gavin Millard, How Can You Fend Off a Nation?, INFOSECURITY 
(Jan. 18, 2016), https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/opinions/how-can-you-fend-off-a-nation/ 
[http://perma.cc/9XEP-ER5J]. 
 23 Brecht, supra note 21, at 28–29; see Waxman, supra note 21, at 422–23 (noting that, due to 
cyber attacks, “[m]ilitary defense networks can be remotely disabled or damaged” and “[p]rivate 
sector networks can be infiltrated, disrupted, or destroyed”); Millard, supra note 22 (noting that 
“hired thugs, instead of being given swords and guns, are afforded extensive resources and tech-
nologies . . . ” to carry out cyber attacks). State-sponsored attacks are carried out at the direction of 
the government for a political purpose. Millard, supra note 22. In contrast, attacks that are not 
state-sponsored (sometimes referred to as “private”) are merely an individual or group operation 
to achieve a personal end. Kimberly Peretti & Jared Slade, State-Sponsored Cybercrime from 
Exploitation to Disruption to Destruction, 10 SCITECH LAW. 12, 13 (2014); Millard, supra note 
22. 
 24 See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Rowe, RATs, TRAPs, and Trade Secrets, 57 B.C. L. REV. 381, 400 
(2016) (recognizing that “[f]oreign governments have used strategic cyberattacks in growing 
numbers ”); Peretti & Slade, supra note 23, at 13 (identifying significant state-sponsored cyber 
attacks on China, Iran, South Korea, and Australia); Sherr & Rosenblatt, supra note 21 (identify-
ing North Korea’s cyber attacks on the United States). There is not a generally agreed-upon defini-
tion of the term “cyber attack” or related terms such as “cyber espionage” and “cyber terrorism,” 
largely because questionable cyber activities are constantly evolving. See MICHAEL N. SCHMITT, 
TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE 106 (2013) 
(defining cyber attack as “a cyber operation, whether offensive or defensive, that is reasonably 
expected to cause injury or death to persons or damage or destruction to objects”); Waxman, supra 
note 21, at 422 (defining cyber attack as the “efforts to alter, disrupt, or destroy computer systems 
or networks or the information or programs on them”); Memorandum from Gen. James E. Cart-
wright for Chiefs of the Military Servs., Commanders of the Combatant Commands, Dirs. of the 
Joint Staff Directories on Joint Terminology for Cyberspace Operations 5 (Nov. 2011) (defining 
cyber attack as “[a] hostile act using computer or related networks or systems, and intended to 
disrupt and/or destroy an adversary’s critical cyber systems, assets, or functions”). In fact, there is 
not even a consensus as to whether “cyber attack” should be written as one word or two. Gary D. 
2172 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:2167 
sponse.25 This Part illustrates this trend with two state-sponsored hacks on 
the United States that occurred prior to the Russian cyber attack on the 
DNC.26 Section A identifies a few of China’s numerous hacks on the U.S. 
government.27 Section B describes North Korea’s highly invasive hacks on 
a U.S. company, Sony Pictures Entertainment.28 Section C then provides a 
detailed account of the Russian cyber attack on the DNC and the U.S. re-
sponse.29 
A. China’s Hacks on the U.S. Government 
The Chinese government has been a usual suspect in hacks on various 
U.S. government agencies and companies.30 For example, China was ac-
cused of hacking the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (“FDIC”) 
computer network between 2010 and 2013.31 According to investigators, 
                                                                                                                           
Solis, Cyber Warfare, 219 MIL. L. REV. 1, 2 (2014). The DNC’s computer network breach was 
arguably an act of cyber espionage (i.e., “unauthorized viewing and copying of data files”) or 
cyber terrorism (i.e. “unlawful attacks and threats of attack against computers, networks, and the 
information stored therein when done to intimidate or coerce a government or its people in fur-
therance of political or social objectives”). OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, supra 
note 14; Michael Gervais, Cyber Attacks and the Laws of War, 30 BERKLEY J. INT’L L. 525, 534; 
Solis, supra, at 3 (quoting CLAY WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, RL32114, BOT-
NETS, CYBERCRIME, AND CYBERTERRORISM: VULNERABILITIES AND POLICY ISSUES FOR CON-
GRESS 12 (2008)). This Note, however, refers to the breach of the DNC’s computer network as a 
cyber attack because its information was not only viewed and copied, but also disseminated to the 
public without a clear motive. See OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, supra note 14; 
Waxman, supra note 21, at 422. 
 25 Compare Gary Brown & Christopher D. Yung, Evaluating the US-China Cybersecurity 
Agreement, Part 1: The US Approach to Cyberspace, THE DIPLOMAT (Jan. 19, 2017), http://the
diplomat.com/2017/01/evaluating-the-us-china-cybersecurity-agreement-part-1-the-us-approach-
to-cyberspace/ [http://perma.cc/H98N-VVYR] (reaching cyber security agreement with China in 
response to hacks), with Exec. Order No. 13,687, 80 Fed. Reg. 819 (Jan. 2, 2015) (barring certain 
North Korean individuals and organizations from accessing U.S. financial systems in response to 
hacks), and Press Release, The White House, supra note 12 (freezing assets of certain Russian 
individuals and entities and barring them from doing business with the United States as well as 
expelling Russian diplomats and closing two Russian compounds). 
 26 See infra notes 30–93 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 30–37 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 38–58 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 59–93 and accompanying text. 
 30 Brown & Yung, supra note 25; Robert Windrem, Exclusive: Secret NSA Map Shows China 
Cyber Attacks on U.S. Targets, NBC NEWS (July 30, 2015), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-
news/exclusive-secret-nsa-map-shows-china-cyber-attacks-us-targets-n401211 [http://perma.cc/
D6A4-UXK6]. 
 31 MAJORITY STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON SCIENCE, SPACE,  & TECH., INTERIM STAFF RE-
PORT: COMM.’S INVESTIGATION OF FDIC’S CYBERSECURITY 6 (2016) [hereinafter H. FDIC RE-
PORT]; Aaron Mamiit, FBI Launched Probe into FDIC Hack: Was China Really Behind the Secu-
rity Breach?, TECHTIMES (Dec. 24, 2016), http://www.techtimes.com/articles/190030/2016
1224/fbi-launched-probe-into-fdic-hack-was-china-really-behind-the-security-breach.htm [http://
perma.cc/6UAD-QKGJ]; Jose Pagliery, China Hacked the FDIC—and US Officials Covered it up, 
2018] Combatting Russia’s Cyber Attack on the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election 2173 
viruses were installed on twelve computers and ten servers at the FDIC, 
including personal computers belonging to high-ranking FDIC officials.32 
These viruses enabled the installer to access information on the computers 
and servers, such as banking data and employee records.33 
China was also accused of hacking the U.S. Office of Personnel Man-
agement in December 2014, obtaining the personal information of over 
twenty million federal employees.34 The damage was so extensive that it 
prompted the United States to negotiate a cyber security agreement with 
China.35 On September 25, 2015, President Barack Obama of the United 
States and President Xi Jinping of China officially agreed that their respec-
tive governments would not engage in or support cyber-enabled theft for 
commercial gain.36 At least one report showed that Chinese government 
hacking activity decreased ninety percent in the months following the 
agreement.37 
B. North Korea’s Hacks on Sony 
On November 24, 2014, Sony Pictures Entertainment (“Sony”) dis-
covered a major breach of its computer network.38 Employees at all Sony 
                                                                                                                           
Report Says, CNN TECH (July 13, 2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/07/13/technology/china-
fdic-hack/ [http://perma.cc/QF69-N6RF]. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation is a gov-
ernment agency that regulates U.S. commercial banks. Mamiit, supra; Pagliery, supra. 
 32 H. FDIC REPORT, supra note 31, at 6; Pagliery, supra note 31. 
 33 Mamiit, supra note 31; Pagliery, supra note 31. 
 34 Ellen Nakashima, Chinese Breach Data of 4 Million Federal Workers, WASH. POST (June 4, 
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/chinese-hackers-breach-federal-
governments-personnel-office/2015/06/04/889c0e52-0af7-11e5-95fd-d580f1c5d44e_story.html 
[http://perma.cc/FAA9-3DWT]; David E. Sanger, U.S. Decides to Retaliate Against China’s 
Hacking, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/01/world/asia/us-
decides-to-retaliate-against-chinas-hacking.html [http://perma.cc/FLW6-E8KX]. The Office of Per-
sonnel Management is a federal agency responsible for recruiting and retaining federal employees. 
Our Agency, OPM.GOV, https://www.opm.gov/about-us/ [http://perma.cc/BT2S-Z4P3]. 
 35 Brown & Yung, supra note 30; Ellen Nakashima & Steven Mufson, U.S., China Vow Not to 
Engage in Economic Cyberespionage, WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/national/us-china-vow-not-to-engage-in-economic-cyberespionage/2015/09/25/90e74b6a-63b9-
11e5-8e9e-dce8a2a2a679_story.html [http://perma.cc/QR6P-3CS2]. 
 36 Brown & Yung, supra note 30; Nakashima & Mufson, supra note 35. 
 37 Joseph Menn & Jim Finkle, Chinese Economic Cyber-Espionage Plummets in U.S.: Ex-
perts, REUTERS (June 21, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyber-spying-china-idUSKCN
0Z700D [http://perma.cc/6KR6-VQL8]; Nafeesa Syeed, U.S. Cyber Deal with China Is Reducing 
Hacking, Official Says, BLOOMBERG TECH. (June 28, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2016-06-28/u-s-cyber-deal-with-china-is-reducing-hacking-official-says [http://perma.cc/
8XJL-FBMZ]. 
 38 Alex Altman & Alex Fitzpatrick, Everything We Know About Sony, The Interview, and North 
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perma.cc/SS8V-TXHG]; Lori Grisham, Timeline: North Korea and the Sony Pictures Hack, USA 
TODAY (Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2014/12/18/sony-hack-
timeline-interview-north-korea/20601645/ [http://perma.cc/YV6L-T9G3]. 
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offices worldwide found themselves unable to login to their computers.39 In 
addition, glowing, red skeletons displayed on their screens along with the 
message “Hacked By #GOP . . . . We’ve already warned you, and this is just 
a beginning . . . . We’ve obtained all of your internal data including your 
secrets . . . .”40 The “GOP,” or Guardians of Peace, also posted a message 
using at least three of Sony’s Twitter accounts specifically threatening 
Sony’s Chief Executive Officer.41 The hacks brought Sony to a standstill as 
employees were forced to shut down their computers.42 
Almost immediately, North Korea was accused of orchestrating the at-
tack as revenge for Sony’s production of “The Interview.”43 The timing was 
indeed suspicious, occurring just a month away from the scheduled release 
date of the comedy about two journalists recruited by the U.S. Central Intel-
ligence Agency to assassinate North Korean leader Kim Jong-un.44 In June 
2014, the isolationist, totalitarian state sent a letter to the United Nations 
Secretary General condemning the movie.45 Specifically, North Korea re-
ferred to the “The Interview” as the “undisguised sponsoring of terrorism, 
as well as an act of war” and pledged “decisive and merciless countermeas-
ure” if “the U.S. administration tacitly approves or supports” the movie.46 
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sony-pictures-north-korea-the-interview/19733463 [http://perma.cc/YQ5Y-XLG7]. 
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 43 Grisham, supra note 38; Weise & Puig, supra note 39; Weisman, supra note 40. 
 44 Grisham, supra note 38; Weisman, supra note 40. Kim Jong-un became the third “supreme 
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Profile: Kim Jong-un, North Korea’s Supreme Commander, BBC NEWS (Jan. 6, 2016), http://www.
bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11388628 [http://perma.cc/9G4Z-4LFS]; Paul Szoldra et al., How a 
Quiet Boy from North Korea Became One of the World’s Scariest Dictators, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 9, 
2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/kim-jong-un-life-2016-9/#some-originally-believed-that-
kim-jong-uns-aunt-and-uncle-were-actually-calling-the-shots-9 [http://perma.cc/36HF-FNSD]. As 
“supreme leader,” Kim Jong-un has complete control over the country, including the world’s fourth-
largest military. Szoldra et al., supra. Under the Kim family regime, North Korea is known as “the 
world’s most oppressed nation” where there is “no freedom of speech or religion,” “the world’s most 
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dark.html [http://perma.cc/6PP7-BJFS]. 
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 46 Weise & Puig, supra note 39; Weisman, supra note 40. 
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North Korea publicly denied responsibility for the Sony hacks, but called it 
a “righteous deed.”47 
The hackers’ reign of terror continued when, on November 27, 2014, 
five of Sony’s films were posted on illegal file-sharing sites.48 By December 
2, 2014, thousands of Sony documents were leaked and many contained 
sensitive employee data such as employees’ social security numbers, home 
addresses, and salaries.49 Soon after, Sony staff received an e-mail threaten-
ing to harm their families if they did not promote the GOP’s goals.50 The 
hackers also posted a message demanding that Sony cancel the release of 
“The Interview” and distributed links to thousands of e-mail exchanges 
from top Sony executives’ accounts.51 
Sony ultimately surrendered to the hackers’ demands on December 17, 
2014, cancelling “The Interview’s” release.52 This announcement came only 
shortly after the hackers’ threat to execute attacks on movie theaters 
prompted several major theater chains to back out of showing the film.53 On 
December 19, 2014, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation publicly an-
nounced its official conclusion that North Korea was responsible for the 
cyber attack on Sony.54 
On January 2, 2015, President Obama signed an Executive Order im-
posing sanctions on North Korea for the cyber attack on Sony.55 This 
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marked the first time in history that the United States had retaliated in re-
sponse to a foreign cyber attack on a U.S. company.56 Specifically, the Ex-
ecutive Order barred ten individuals and three organizations, including 
North Korea’s main intelligence agency and primary arms exporter, from 
accessing U.S. financial systems.57 In reality, these sanctions only minimal-
ly affected North Korea because it has long been one of the most isolated 
countries in the world.58 
C. Russia’s Cyber Attack on the DNC 
The media first reported that Russian hackers breached the DNC’s 
computer network on June 14, 2016 and shortly thereafter, a hacker named 
Guccifer 2.0 claimed responsibility.59 Crowdstrike, an American cyber se-
curity firm, promptly analyzed the breach and confirmed the initial re-
ports.60 The fallout began on July 22, 2016—just three days before the 
Democratic National Convention—when WikiLeaks published “part one” 
of a “new Hillary Leaks series.”61 Part one was comprised of 19,252 e-mails 
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Campaign Committee and then the DNC. Alperovitch, supra note 7; Lipton et al., supra note 7. 
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and 8,034 attachments from high-ranking DNC officials.62 The e-mails 
spanned from January 2015 to May 2016 and contained a number of im-
portant conversations.63 For example, one e-mail showed party officials dis-
cussing a campaign strategy to undermine Clinton’s main competitor for the 
Democratic presidential nomination, Bernie Sanders.64 The e-mails also 
disclosed party donors’ personal information including their addresses, 
credit card numbers, and even some passport and social security numbers.65 
The hacks again incited chaos when, on October 6, 2016, DCLeaks 
published e-mails from Capricia Marshall’s account.66 Marshall worked 
closely with Clinton on her campaign and the e-mails thus divulged sensi-
tive information about campaign efforts, including conversations with the 
media and networking strategies.67 
The day after DCLeaks released Marshall’s e-mails, WikiLeaks pub-
lished the first batch in a series of fifty thousand e-mails from an account 
belonging to Clinton campaign chairman John Podesta.68 At least some of 
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the e-mails brought the Clinton Campaign into disrepute.69 For example, an 
email exchange between a Center for American Progress fellow and Clin-
ton’s Communications Director stated that conservatives are attracted to 
Catholicism due to “the systematic thought and severely backwards gender 
relations” and because “[t]heir rich friends wouldn’t understand if they be-
came evangelicals.”70 
On November 7, 2016—the day before the presidential election—
WikiLeaks published thousands of additional e-mails from DNC officials.71 
This was yet another massive leak of information that should have been 
kept confidential, including an e-mail attachment regarding Clinton’s efforts 
to raise millions of dollars for the United States to host a pavilion at the 
World Exposition 2010 Shanghai China.72 According to the e-mail attach-
ment, Clinton, as Secretary of State, ignored ethics guidelines in the process 
of soliciting donations for the U.S. pavilion and the donors later received 
“favorable treatment” from the U.S. Department of State.73 
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On January 6, 2017, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
released an assessment laying out the conclusion that President of Russia 
Vladimir Putin “ordered an influence campaign” intentionally designed to 
challenge public confidence in the American democracy, destroy Clinton’s 
credibility, and increase Trump’s chances of winning the 2016 U.S. presi-
dential election.74 According to investigators, the Russian government di-
rected its intelligence agencies to obtain information from U.S. campaign 
organizations, think tanks, and lobbying groups.75 The assessment pinpoint-
ed Russia’s Main Intelligence Directorate (known as the GRU) as responsi-
ble for breaching the DNC’s computer network and using the Guccifer 2.0 
persona, DCLeaks, and WikiLeaks to release the acquired data.76 
In response to Russia’s cyber attack on the DNC, U.S. President 
Barack Obama issued an Executive Order on December 28, 2016.77 It 
amended an April 1, 2015 Executive Order, under which anyone found en-
gaging in or responsible for certain cyber-enabled activities outside the 
United States would have their assets in the United States frozen and be 
prohibited from participating in business transactions in the United States.78 
Specifically, the April 1, 2015 Executive Order applied to cyber-enabled 
activities with the purpose or effect of “harming . . . a critical infrastructure 
sector,” “causing a significant disrupt to the availability of a computer or 
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network . . .” or “causing a significant misappropriation of funds or eco-
nomic resources, trade secrets, personal identifiers, or financial information 
for commercial or competitive advantage or financial gain.”79 
The December 28, 2016 Executive Order expanded the list of cyber-
enabled activities covered to include “tampering with, altering, or causing a 
misappropriation of information with the purpose or effect of interfering 
with or undermining election processes or institutions . . . .”80 The Decem-
ber 28 Executive Order also explicitly identified five Russian entities (in-
cluding the GRU) and four Russian individuals that violated the new provi-
sion.81 Accordingly, their assets in the United States were frozen and they 
were barred from doing business with anyone in the United States.82 
After issuing the December 28, 2016 Executive Order, President 
Obama announced that the U.S. Department of State declared thirty-five 
Russian diplomats and consular officials in the United States “persona non 
grata.”83 Accordingly, the diplomats were expelled from the United States 
and given seventy-two hours to leave.84 The U.S. Department of State also 
informed the Russian government that it could no longer access two com-
pounds it owned in the United States.85 According to U.S. officials, the Rus-
sians primarily used them to conduct intelligence activities.86 Russian offi-
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cials, however, insisted that the compounds were merely used as vacation 
homes for Russian diplomats.87 
President Obama announced that the sanctions came after his admin-
istration issued multiple warnings to the Russian government and were a 
“necessary and appropriate response to efforts to harm U.S. interests in vio-
lation of established international norms of behavior.”88 He went on to give 
assurance that these actions were only the beginning of the U.S. response to 
Russia’s hacks.89 It was widely speculated that further U.S. action involved 
executing retaliatory hacks on Russian intelligence agencies.90 
Russia openly condemned the sanctions, particularly because they 
were imposed just three weeks before President Obama was leaving of-
fice.91 Specifically, a spokesperson for Russia President Vladimir Putin stat-
ed that the order was intended “to further harm Russian-American ties, 
which are at a low point as it is” and “deal a blow on the foreign policy 
plans of the incoming administration[.]”92 Russia denied responsibility for 
the hacks and vowed to retaliate against the United States for imposing 
sanctions.93 
                                                                                                                           
 87 See Mazzetti & Schmidt, supra note 85 (describing the compounds as “[a] pair of luxurious 
waterfront compounds . . . [that] have for decades been a retreat for Russian diplomats, places to 
frolic in the water, play tennis and take lengthy steam baths” and noting that “Obama administra-
tion officials described the compounds differently: as beachside spy nests sometimes used by 
Russian intelligence operatives to have long conversations on the sand to avoid being snared by 
American electronic surveillance”); Andrey Rezchikov et al., Russia Wants the Return of Its 
American Dachas Illegally Taken by Obama, RUSS. BEYOND THE HEADLINES (Feb. 13, 2017), 
http://rbth.com/international/2017/02/13/russia-wants-the-return-of-its-american-dachas-illegally-
taken-by-obama_701328 [http://perma.cc/66WW-H2J8] (noting that Russian diplomats used both 
compounds to host receptions and festivities, including Victory Day celebrations and New Year’s 
parties for children); Adam Taylor, The Luxurious, 45-Acre Compound in Maryland Being Shut 
Down for Alleged Russian Espionage, WASH. POST (Dec. 29, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/12/29/the-luxurious-45-acre-compound-in-maryland-being-shut-
down-for-alleged-russian-espionage/?utm_term=.239a51cee77d [http://perma.cc/TA7S-NHAR] 
(identifying a Russian ambassador that previously described one of the compounds as a “tradition-
al Russian summer house, or dacha, he was used to back home” and quoting his wife as saying 
that they went there “to hide for a while” from their “hectic life”). 
 88 Press Release, The White House, supra note 12. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Lee Ferran, The NSA Is Likely ‘Hacking Back’ Russia’s Cyber Squads, ABC NEWS (July 
30, 2016), http://abcnews.go.com/International/nsa-hacking-back-russias-cyber-squads/story?id=
41010651 [http://perma.cc/BQN8-QXHP]; Ellen Nakashima, Obama Administration Is Close to 
Announcing Measures to Punish Russia for Election Interference, WASH. POST (Dec. 27, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/the-white-house-is-scrambling-for-a-
way-to-punish-russian-hackers-via-sanctions/2016/12/27/0eee2fdc-c58f-11e6-85b5-76616a33048d_
story.html?utm_term=.70fe81b3a3da [http://perma.cc/RWS5-BFZ6]. 
 91 Gambino et al., supra note 11; Sanger, supra note 11. 
 92 David Jackson, Obama Sanctions Russian Officials Over Election Hacking, USA TODAY 
(Dec. 29, 2016), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2016/12/29/barack-obama-russia-
sanctions-vladimir-putin/95958472/ [http://perma.cc/5CG4-WLEV]; Sanger, supra note 11. 
 93 Jackson, supra note 92; Sanger, supra note 11. 
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II. THE INTERNATIONAL LAWS AND PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING THE U.S. 
RESPONSE TO RUSSIA’S CYBER ATTACK 
There is not a comprehensive, international legal framework that ex-
plicitly prohibits state-sponsored cyber attacks, let alone one that prescribes 
a punishment.94 Consequently, in responding to Russia’s cyber attack on the 
DNC, the United States was forced to rely on international laws and princi-
ples that were not directly applicable.95 Specifically, the U.S. response in-
volved the doctrine of retorsions, economic sanctions law and practice, and 
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.96 This Part discusses these 
international laws and principles generally and in the context of the U.S. 
                                                                                                                           
 94 Oona A. Hathaway et al., The Law of Cyber-Attack, 100 CAL. L. REV. 817, 840–41 (2012); 
Duncan B. Hollis, Why States Need an International Law for Information Operations, 11 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 1023, 1037 (2007); Jens David Ohlin, Did Russian Cyber Interference in the 2016 
Election Violate International Law?, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1579, 1579–80 (2017); Matthew J. Sklerov, 
Solving the Dilemma of State Responses to Cyber Attacks: A Justification for the Use of Active 
Defenses Against States Who Neglect Their Duty to Prevent 6 (Apr. 2009) (unpublished LL.M. 
thesis, The Judge Advocate General’s School) (on file with the Homeland Security Digital Library). 
The only international law that address any form of cyber crime is the Convention on Cybercrime 
(also referred to as the Budapest Convention). The Council of Europe drafted the Convention on 
Cybercrime and submitted it for signatures in 2001. Hathaway et al., supra, at 862–63; Chart of Sig-
natures and Ratifications of Treaty 185, COUNCIL OF EUR., https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/
full-list/-/conventions/treaty/185/signatures?p_auth=W4JU5WPj [http://perma.cc/3BGD-U4DR]. As 
of April 17, 2018, fifty-seven countries ratified it; the United States is one, Russia and China are not. 
Chart of Signatures and Ratifications of Treaty 185, supra. The Convention on Cybercrime requires 
states to criminalize a broad range of cyber crimes under domestic law including child pornography 
and copyright infringement. Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001, E.T.S. 185, T.I.A.S. 13174. 
It does not apply to government action, such as state-sponsored cyber attacks. Hathaway et al., supra, 
at 877; see Convention on Cybercrime, supra. There are arguments that Russia’s cyber attack on the 
DNC violated an international law that does not explicitly address cyber crime, such as the right to 
self-determination—a country’s right to structure their own government. Ohlin, supra. 
 95 See Hathaway et al., supra note 94, 840–41(arguing that laws of war are extremely hard to 
apply to cyber attacks); Hollis, supra note 94, at 1037, 1039–40 (acknowledging that “there are no 
specific rules” for information operations such as cyber attacks and the laws of war apply by anal-
ogy); Sklerov, supra note 94 (recognizing that there is not a comprehensive treaty for international 
cyber attacks and states are forced to “practice law by analogy”). 
 96 See Philip Bump, How to Be Declared ‘Persona Non Grata’ and Get Yourself Kicked Out of 
the United States, WASH. POST (Dec. 29, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/
wp/2016/12/29/how-to-be-declared-a-persona-non-grata-and-get-yourself-kicked-out-of-the-united-
states/?utm_term=.bf73f6087adb [http://perma.cc/K6NJ-MHF2] (identifying U.S. reliance on the 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (“VCDR”) in responding to Russia’s cyber attack); 
Ryan Goodman, International Law and the US Response to Russian Election Interference, JUST 
SECURITY (Jan. 5, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/35999/international-law-response-russian-
election-interference/ [http://perma.cc/H8KM-DWMC] (identifying U.S. use of retorsions in re-
sponding to Russia’s cyber attack); Greg Miller et al., Obama’s Secret Struggle to Punish Russia for 
Putin’s Election Assault, WASH. POST (June 23, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/
2017/world/national-security/obama-putin-election-hacking/?utm_term=.f24db992492e [http://
perma.cc/QZT5-789X] (identifying U.S. use of economic sanctions in responding to Russia’s 
cyber attack). 
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response to Russia’s cyber attack on the DNC.97 Section A of this Part ex-
plains the doctrine of retorsions.98 Section B provides a detailed overview 
of economic sanctions.99 Section C addresses the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations.100 Lastly, Section D shows how each of these interna-
tional laws and principles were in play in the U.S. response to Russia’s 
cyber attack on the DNC.101 
A. Retorsions 
Retorsions, or unfriendly acts taken consistently with the acting state’s 
international obligations, have long been recognized as a remedy in interna-
tional law.102 They are often referred to as a form of “self-help,” actions that 
states take to enforce their rights or protect their interests without authoriza-
tion from an international organization.103 Retorsions typically involve one 
state acting against another, but international organizations may use them or 
be subject to them.104 
                                                                                                                           
 97 See infra notes 102–189 and accompanying text. 
 98 See infra notes 102–117 and accompanying text. 
 99 See infra notes 118–145 and accompanying text. 
 100 See infra notes 146–167 and accompanying text. 
 101 See infra notes 168–189 and accompanying text. 
 102 Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at 325 
(2001); Tom Ruys, Sanctions, Retorsions and Countermeasures: Concepts and International Legal 
Framework, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON UN SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 24 (Larissa 
van den Herik ed. 2017); THOMAS GIEGERICH, RETORSION, MAX PLANCK ENCY. OF PUB. INT’L L. 
¶ 2; Joacquín Alcaide Fernández, Countermeasures, OXFORD BIBLIOGRAPHIES, http://www.oxford
bibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199796953/obo-9780199796953-0072.xml [http://
perma.cc/86CN-TCBP] (last updated Oct. 29, 2013). Retorsions are distinguished from counter-
measures, which have effectively replaced the nineteenth century idea of reprisals, or “acts of self-
help by the injured State, acts in retaliation for acts contrary to international law on the part of the 
offending State, which have remained unredressed after a demand for amends.” Ruys, supra, at 
32; Matthias Ruffert, Reprisals, OXFORD PUB. INT’L L., http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/
law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1771 [http://perma.cc/3NMS-VDC8] (last updated 
Sept. 2015). Unlike retorsions, countermeasures are unlawful acts; they are inconsistent with the 
imposing state’s international obligations, and must be taken in response to an international law 
violation. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 42 (Matthew Happold & Paul Eden 
ed. 2016); Hathaway et al., supra note 94, at 845 n.109. The rules on countermeasures are mainly 
found in the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, which 
provide that an injured state may employ countermeasures in response to an “internationally 
wrongful act.” Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, supra, at 324. In 
order for an act to be deemed “internationally wrongful,” it must satisfy two conditions set forth in 
Article 2: (1) it must violate one of the perpetrating state’s international obligations; and (2) the 
act must be attributable to the state against which countermeasures are sought. Id. at 68. 
 103 Ruys, supra note 102, at 24; GIEGERICH, supra note 102, ¶ 1. State action taken without 
support from another state or an international organization is often called “unilateral” action. 
Richard B. Bilder, The Role of Unilateral State Action in Preventing International Environmental 
Injury, 14 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 51, 54 (1981). 
 104 Ruys, supra note 102, at 24; GIEGERICH, supra note 102, ¶ 1. 
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International law does not explicitly restrain the use of retorsions and 
states generally view them as a right rather than a privilege.105 In fact, an 
international law violation is not required to justify retorsions, but they 
sometimes succeed international law violations.106 States enjoy wide discre-
tion when imposing retorsions; the only real limitation is that they must be 
consistent with the imposing state’s international obligations.107 
What an individual state’s international obligations are—and whether a 
certain act violates one of those obligations—is far from clear under the 
current international law framework.108 Article 38 of the Statute of the In-
ternational Court of Justice provides some guidance, identifying the primary 
sources of law as international conventions, international custom, general 
principles of law, and the judicial decisions and teachings from the most 
highly qualified publicists.109 Given the ever-expanding regulatory breadth 
of international law and the constantly developing, complex relationships 
between countries, many states have countless international obligations that 
are difficult to ascertain.110 Thus, the limitation that retorsions must be con-
sistent with the acting state’s international obligations is a significant and 
unclear one.111 
                                                                                                                           
 105 Ruys, supra note 102, at 24; GIEGERICH, supra note 102, ¶ 1; see Fernández, supra note 
102 (stating that the doctrine of retorsions is not covered by the International Law Commission’s 
work on international responsibility). 
 106 CHARLES CHENEY HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED 
BY THE UNITED STATES VOLUME II 169–70 (1922); Ruys, supra note 102, at 24; GIEGERICH, 
supra note 102, ¶ 1. 
 107 Ruys, supra note 102, at 24; GIEGERICH, supra note 102, ¶¶ 1, 14. Retorsions are not le-
gally required to be proportional to the act they are in response to. GIEGERICH, supra note 102, 
¶ 14. 
 108 MATH NOORTMANN, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAW: FROM SELF-HELP TO SELF-
CONTAINED REGIMES 44 (2016); see Ruys, supra note 102, at 24 (recognizing the difficulty “in 
determining whether or not certain measures do or do not amount to a breach of an international 
obligation of the State (or organization) engaging in them”). 
 109 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38. The Statute of the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ) is annexed to the United Nations (UN) Charter. Basic Documents, INT’L CT. OF 
JUST., http://www.icj-cij.org/en/basic-documents [http://perma.cc/44NN-7GYK]. The UN Charter 
established the ICJ as the UN’s “principal judicial organ.” U.N. Charter art. 92, 93 ¶ 1. The Statute 
of the ICJ sets forth the rules and procedures for the ICJ. See Statute of the International Court of 
Justice. 
 110 See NOORTMANN, supra note 108 (“Considering the increasing sophistication of interna-
tional regulation and law-making, the very question of whether a specific measure constitutes a 
violation of an international obligation or not is likely to become the very subject of the dispute.”); 
Ruys, supra note 102, at 24 (determining whether an act is consistent with a state’s international 
obligations may require “careful scrutiny . . . under relevant customary law, bilateral treaty law 
and multilateral treaty law”). 
 111 See NOORTMANN, supra note 108 (recognizing that “it is not easy to determine whether a 
specific measure violates a legal obligation in a given situation or not”); see Ruys, supra note 102, 
at 24 (recognizing the difficulty in determining whether certain measures are a breach of the im-
posing state’s international obligations). 
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Nevertheless, certain retorsions are ordinarily considered legal, espe-
cially those by which the imposing state revokes a privilege that it was un-
der no obligation to give at the outset.112 For instance, retorsions may in-
volve refusing access to ports, canceling diplomatic visits, and declaring 
diplomats “personas non grata.”113 They may also involve revoking interna-
tional aid, recalling military assistance, or withdrawing from an internation-
al organization.114 States usually cannot take more severe action without 
violating one of its international obligations.115 For example, if a state were 
to impose a trade embargo or threaten military intervention, it would likely 
violate the principle of non-intervention or the prohibition on the threat or 
use of force set forth in Article 2(4) of the United Nations (UN) Charter.116 
Therefore, retorsions are typically a very mild form of retaliation, causing 
only minimal disruption to the receiving state’s affairs.117 
                                                                                                                           
 112 See NOORTMANN, supra note 108 (acknowledging the ICJ’s holding in Nicaragua v. Unit-
ed States); GIEGERICH, supra note 102, ¶ 10 (identifying retorsions which involve a state invoking 
a privilege such as denying ship access to ports and terminating economic aid). In Nicaragua v. 
United States, Nicaragua argued that the United States illegally intervened in its affairs in ceasing 
U.S. economic aid to Nicaragua out of vehement disapproval of the Nicaraguan government. Mili-
tary and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 
14, 67 (June 27). The ICJ held, rather vaguely, that “the cessation of economic aid, the giving of 
which is more of a unilateral and voluntary nature, could be regarded as such a violation [of the 
obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of the treaty] only in exceptional circumstances.” 
Id. 
 113 Ruys, supra note 102, at 24; YONG ZHOU, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND LEGAL CO-
OPERATION IN GENERAL DIPLOMACY AND CONSULAR RELATIONS 336 (2014); GIEGERICH, supra 
note 102, ¶ 10. 
 114 ZHOU, supra note 113; GIEGERICH, supra note 102, ¶ 10. 
 115 Ruys, supra note 102; see GIEGERICH, supra note 102, ¶ 24 (“Even though a specific 
measure of retorsion does not as such violate international law, its use for an illegitimate end, 
namely an intervention, will render it unlawful if its coercive force is strong enough to pose a 
serious threat to the self-determination of the target State . . . .”). 
 116 Ruys, supra note 102; see GIEGERICH, supra note 102, ¶ 25 (recognizing that interrupting the 
supply of critical goods to another state is illegal). The customary international principle of non-
intervention was codified in the UN General Assembly’s 1965 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of 
Intervention and Interference in the Domestic Affairs of States. William Mattesich, Digital Destruc-
tion: Applying the Principle of Non-Intervention to Distributed Denial of Service Attacks Manifesting 
No Physical Damage, 54 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 873, 879–80 (2016); Carolyn Dubay, A Re-
fresher on the Principle of Non-Intervention, INT’L JUDICIAL MONITOR (2014), http://www.judicial
monitor.org/archive_spring2014/generalprinciples.html [http://perma.cc/EX7J-XF86]. There, the 
principle of non-intervention is formulated as: “[n]o State has the right to intervent, directly or indi-
rectly, for any reason whatsoever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State.” G.A. Res. 
36/103 (Dec. 9, 1981). Article 2(4) of the UN Charter declares that “[a]ll Members shall refrain in 
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or politi-
cal independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United 
Nations.” U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4. 
 117 GBENGA ODUNTAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BOUNDARY DISPUTES IN AFRICA 326 
(2015); GIEGERICH, supra note 102, ¶ 29. 
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B. Economic Sanctions 
Like retorsions, sanctions are measures intended to enforce states’ 
rights or protect their interests.118 In fact, sanctions are often confused with 
retorsions or considered an umbrella term that includes retorsions.119 Unlike 
retorsions, though, sanctions are not usually defined as limited to actions 
that are consistent with the state’s international obligations.120 There is, 
however, not a widely agreed upon definition of the term “sanctions” and 
there are at least three different ways of defining it.121 
The first way is to broadly define sanctions as any action, whether tak-
en by a state or institution, “against a State to compel it to obey internation-
al law or to punish it for a breach of international law.”122 The second is 
much narrower: sanctions are the UN Security Council’s actions pursuant to 
Article 41 of the UN Charter.123 A number of scholars embrace a third, more 
middle ground approach, recognizing sanctions as any international organi-
zations’ actions taken against its members and in accordance with its 
rules.124 
                                                                                                                           
 118 Natalino Ronzitti, Conclusion, in COERCIVE DIPLOMACY, SANCTIONS AND INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 287 (Natalino Ronzitti ed. 2016); see Ruys, supra note 102, at 22–23 (recognizing 
“sanction” as referring to a certain type of measure to “(i) coerce or change behavior; (ii) to con-
strain access to resources needed to engage in certain activities; or (iii) to signal and stigmatize”). 
 119 CHRISTINA ECKES, EU COUNTER-TERRORIST POLICIES AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: THE 
CASE OF INDIVIDUAL SANCTIONS 16 (2009); see JAN KLABBERS, INTERNATIONAL LAW 183 
(2017) (describing retorsions as “the most ubiquitous of sanctions”); Hans-Martien ten Napel, The 
Concept of International Crimes of States: Walking the Thin Line Between Progressive Develop-
ment and Disintegration of the International Legal Order, 1 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 149, 151 (1988) 
(describing retorsions as individual sanctions). 
 120 See KLABBERS, supra note 119, at 183 (“[W]hat characterizes the retorsion is that it re-
mains within the law”); ALAIN PELLET & ALINA MIRON, SANCTIONS, MAX PLANCK ENCY. OF 
PUB. INT’L L., ¶ 4 (declining to limit sanctions to actions consistent with a state’s international 
obligations). 
 121 Ruys, supra note 102, at 19–22; Clara Portela, The EU’s Use of ‘Targeted Sanctions’ 3 
(CEPS, Working Paper No. 391, 2014); Boris Kondoch, Sanctions in International Law, OXFORD 
BIBLIOGRAPHIES, http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199743292/obo-
9780199743292-0191.xml#obo-9780199743292-0191-bibItem-0002 [http://perma.cc/Z8ZW-4DYN] 
(last updated Sept. 28, 2016). 
 122 Ruys, supra note 102, at 19 (quoting Sanctions, A DICTIONARY OF LAW (Johnathan Law 
ed. 2015)); see PELLET & MIRON, supra note 120, ¶ 4 (defining sanctions broadly as “all types of 
consequences triggered by the violation of an international legal rule”). 
 123 Ruys, supra note 102, at 20; PELLET & MIRON, supra note 120, ¶ 11; see U.N. Charter art. 
41 (“The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to 
be employed to give effect to its decisions . . . . These may include complete or partial interruption 
of economic relations and of . . . means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic rela-
tions.”). 
 124 Ruys, supra note 102, at 21; Michael Brzoska, International Sanctions Before and Beyond 
UN Sanctions, 91 INT’L AFF. 1339, 1345 (2015); PELLET & MIRON, supra note 120, ¶ 10; see 
Kondoch, supra note 121 (recognizing a common understanding that sanctions “refers to the mul-
tilateral measures adopted by states through the United Nations or another international organiza-
tion”). 
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Under any definition, sanctions may take a variety of forms including 
trade embargos, travel bans, and asset freezes.125 Sanctions may also serve a 
number of different purposes.126 For instance, they may be designed to alter 
behavior, inhibit access to resources, or send a message.127 Furthermore, 
sanctions may be specifically targeted to affect only certain individuals 
deemed responsible for objectionable activity, rather than broadly affecting 
a country’s population as a whole.128 
Sanctions imposed today are most frequently in the category of “eco-
nomic sanctions.”129 “Economic sanctions” are sometimes defined as the 
“deliberate, government inspired withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of 
customary trade or financial relations.”130 For instance, economic sanctions 
may take the form of freezing or seizing assets, trade embargoes, tariff in-
creases, or bans on cash transfers.131 
Economic sanctions have a long and contentious history.132 The UN 
Charter merely states that the UN Security Council may impose economic 
and certain other sanctions, but is silent as to whether individual states may 
impose sanctions.133 Nevertheless, many argue that economic sanctions are 
contrary to international law because they are coercive to an extent that they 
                                                                                                                           
 125 Ruys, supra note 102, at 21; Brzoska, supra note 124, at 1343–45; Meredith Rathbone et 
al., Sanctions, Sanctions Everywhere: Forging a Path Through Complex Transnational Sanctions 
Laws, 44 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1055, 1057 (2013). 
 126 Ruys, supra note 102, at 22; Jonathan Masters, What Are Economic Sanctions?, COUNCIL 
ON FOREIGN REL., https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-are-economic-sanctions [http://perma.
cc/ATR7-KHEX] (last updated Aug. 7, 2017). 
 127 Ruys, supra note 102, at 22–23; Masters, supra note 126. 
 128 Portela, supra note 121, at 4; Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Barbara Oegg, Targeted Sanctions: 
A Policy Alternative, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. (Feb. 23, 2000), https://piie.com/
commentary/speeches-papers/targeted-sanctions-policy-alternative [http://perma.cc/5JMV-2V99]. 
Sanctions specifically targeted to affect only certain individuals are sometimes referred to as 
“smart sanctions.” Portela, supra note 121, at 4; Hufbauer & Oegg, supra. 
 129 Paul Szasz, The Law of Economic Sanctions, in 71 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 455; 
BARRY E. CARTER, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, MAX PLANCK ENCY. OF PUB. INT’L L., ¶ 33. 
 130 GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED 3 (3d ed. 2009). 
 131 Barry Klodokin, What Are Sanctions?, THOUGHTCO., https://www.thoughtco.com/what-
are-sanctions-3310373[http://perma.cc/TL3N-C8N2] (last updated May 15, 2017); Masters, supra 
note 126. 
 132 CARTER, supra note 129, ¶ 7; see Szasz, supra note 129, at 455 (acknowledging that there 
are numerous instances in which economic sanctions have been imposed with questionable effec-
tiveness and legal issues). Economic sanctions were imposed as early as 432 B.C. when Pericles 
limited the entry of products from Megara, Greece to Athens, Greece in retaliation for Megara 
adding new territory and kidnapping three women. CARTER, supra note 129, ¶ 7. In the years 
since then, states have continued to impose economic sanctions to achieve various, and often con-
troversial, objectives such as inciting a governmental regime change, interfering with a state’s 
development of nuclear weapons, protecting human rights, and fighting terrorism. Id. 
 133 UN Charter art. 41; Mergen Doraev, The “Memory Effect” of Economic Sanctions Against 
Russia: Opposing Approaches to the Legality of Unilateral Sanctions Clash Again, 37 U. PA. J. 
INT’L L. 355, 373–74 (2015). 
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are a prohibited use of force under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and vio-
late the customary international law principle of non-intervention.134 Ac-
cordingly, the UN General Assembly has adopted a number of resolutions in 
attempt to bar states from imposing economic measures—including both 
sanctions and retorsions—without UN authorization.135 One such resolution 
is the 1965 “Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Do-
mestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sov-
ereignty.”136 This resolution prohibited states from coercing another state 
using economic, political, or other measures to interfere with its sovereignty 
or receive a benefit.137 A similar resolution was adopted in 1995 and entitled 
“Economic Measures as a Means of Political and Economic Coercion 
against Developing Countries.”138 There, the UN General Assembly strong-
ly encouraged states to adopt urgent and effective measures to cease em-
ploying coercive measures against developing countries that are not author-
ized by the UN or are inconsistent with the UN Charter.139 Even if these UN 
resolutions are not binding upon UN member states, the international com-
munity has repeatedly acknowledged that economic sanctions are illegal.140 
These resolutions and other organizational attempts to limit the use of 
economic sanctions were largely unsuccessful.141 Many only bind a few 
states, contain vague or overly broad provisions, or lack an effective en-
forcement mechanism.142 Many states, especially the United States, routine-
ly impose economic sanctions on their own accord without formal conse-
quences.143 Economic sanctions thus remain an optimal yet legally dubious 
choice for states and international organizations seeking to pressure, punish, 
                                                                                                                           
 134 Szasz, supra note 129, at 456; CARTER, supra note 129, ¶¶ 12–13. 
 135 See G.A. Res. 46/210, ¶ 1 (Dec. 20, 1991); G.A. Res. 2131 (XX), ¶ 2 (Dec. 21, 1965); 
Szasz, supra note 129, at 456. 
 136 G.A. Res. 2131, supra note 135; Szasz, supra note 129, at 457. 
 137 G.A. Res. 46/210, supra note 135. 
 138 Id.; Szasz, supra note 129, at 457. 
 139 G.A. Res. 46/210, supra note 135; Szasz, supra note 129, at 457. 
 140 Doraev, supra note 133, at 376–77; see Szasz, supra note 129, at 458 (noting that the in-
ternational community has adopted strong resolutions of condemnation of the U.S. economic sanc-
tions on Cuba). 
 141 CARTER, supra note 129, ¶ 18; see Szasz, supra note 129, at 455, 458 (stating that eco-
nomic sanctions are widely used even though states cannot claim a general legal right to impose 
them). 
 142 CARTER, supra note 129, ¶ 13; see HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 130, at 139–40 (noting 
that the UN does not have a military to enforce its arms embargos and UN resolutions on arms 
embargos are vague). 
 143 See CARTER, supra note 129, ¶ 33 (acknowledging that “[e]conomic sanctions have be-
come a fact of international life and a tool of international diplomacy” and “[e]fforts . . . to some-
how limit these sanctions under the UN Charter or customary international law made little head-
way”); Masters, supra note 126 (acknowledging that economic sanctions are widely used and, 
although U.S. sanctions have evoked anger, the United States was never formally reprimanded). 
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or shame states.144 This is mainly due to their cost-efficient, low-risk na-
ture—not necessarily their effectiveness which is generally inconsistent and 
intensely debated.145 
C. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 
The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (“VCDR”) was 
signed in 1961 and nearly all countries have agreed to be bound to it.146 It 
culminated the effort to codify customary international law on diplomatic 
relations between states.147 The VCDR now serves as a comprehensive 
framework for creating, maintaining, and ceasing diplomatic relations on a 
consensual basis.148 
Under Article 9 of the VCDR, a state is allowed to pronounce a diplo-
mat it has received into its territory “persona non grata.”149 States’ right to 
                                                                                                                           
 144 CARTER, supra note 129, ¶ 33; Masters, supra note 126; see Doraev, supra note 133, at 
388 (“[T]he United States historically considers economic sanctions as a legitimate tool of its 
foreign policy . . . . Nevertheless, although this practice might be supported by the ancient ‘Lotus 
principle’ that a state is permitted to do everything, which is not affirmatively prohibited, the 
United States prefers to keep a distance from debates on the legality of sanctions.”). 
 145 CARTER, supra note 129, ¶ 33; Richard N. Haass, Economic Sanctions: Too Much of a 
Bad Thing, BROOKINGS (June 1, 1998), https://www.brookings.edu/research/economic-sanctions-
too-much-of-a-bad-thing/ [http://perma.cc/7SPZ-58JG] (“In a global economy, unilateral sanc-
tions tend to impose greater costs on American firms than on the target, which can usually find 
substitute sources of supply and financing.”); Masters, supra note 126. 
 146 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L., https://www.asil.org/eisil/
vienna-convention-diplomatic-relations [http://perma.cc/4YM5-W3UG] [hereinafter VCDR, AM. 
SOC’Y INT’L L.]; Jan Wouters & Sanderjin Duquet, The Vienna Conventions on Diplomacy and 
Consular Relations, OXFORD BIBLIOGRAPHIES, http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/
document/obo-9780199743292/obo-9780199743292-0112.xml [http://perma.cc/97GQ-XDH9] (last 
updated Jan. 11, 2018). As of August 16, 2017, the VCDR has 191 parties. Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations, UN TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=
TREATY&mtdsg_no=III-3&chapter=3&lang=en [http://perma.cc/9MEF-FXEW]. 
 147 VCDR, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L., supra note 146; Wouters & Duquet, supra note 146. 
 148 VCDR, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L., supra note 146; Wouters & Duquet, supra note 146. The 
VCDR is similar to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (“VCCR”), which was signed 
in 1963. Wouters & Duquet, supra note 146. Whereas the VCDR pertains to diplomats, the VCCR 
governs consuls. Id. Both diplomats and consuls are representative of foreign governments, but 
consuls receive less extensive immunities under the VCCR than diplomats under the VCDR. Cami 
Green, Counsel, Consul, or Diplomat: Is There Any Practical Significance for Practitioners?, 1 U. 
MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 143, 148–49 (1991). Whether a foreign representative is a diplo-
mat or consular is usually determined simply by how the receiving state identifies them. Id. at 149. 
 149 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 3233–34, 
500 U.N.T.S. 95, 102 [hereinafter VCDR]; CRAIG BARKER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNA-
TIONAL RELATIONS 167 (2000). Article 9 of the VCDR is as follows: 
 1. The receiving State may at any time and without having to explain its deci-
sion, notify the sending State that the head of the mission or any member of the dip-
lomatic staff of the mission is persona non grata or that any other member of the 
staff of the mission is not acceptable. 
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declare a diplomat “persona non grata” pre-dates the VCDR and is one of 
the most ancient principles of diplomatic law.150 In declaring a diplomat 
“persona non grata,” the diplomat is “not acceptable” and the state that sent 
the diplomat must “recall the person concerned or terminate his functions 
with the mission.”151 
Article 9 of the VCDR does not entitle the receiving state to physically 
remove the diplomat.152 Rather, the sending state must tell them to return.153 
If, for whatever reason, the diplomat does not leave within a reasonable 
time, the receiving state may treat them as any other foreign individual—
that is, without diplomatic immunity or privileges.154 Aside from these pro-
cedural limitations, states have free-reign to declare diplomats “persona non 
grata”; they can make the declaration at any time, for any reason.155 The 
right is not susceptible to abuse, because in reality, its exercise minimally 
disrupts the sending state’s affairs, merely requiring them to ensure that the 
unwelcome diplomat departs and perhaps reorganize the diplomatic mission 
to some extent.156 
Although the VCDR permits a state to expel foreign diplomats, it 
heavily restricts a state’s ability to interfere with the premises of a diplomat-
                                                                                                                           
 2. If the sending state refuses or fails within a reasonable period to carry out its 
obligations under paragraph 1 of this article, the receiving State may refuse to rec-
ognize the person concerned as a member of the mission. 
VCDR, supra. 
 150 Amer Fakhoury, Persona Non Grata: The Obligation of Diplomats to Respect the Laws 
and Regulations of the Hosting State, 57 J.L. POL’Y & GLOBALIZATION 110, 111 (2017); JEAN 
D’ASPREMONT, PERSONA NON GRATA, MAX PLANCK ENCY. OF PUB. INT’L L., ¶ 1 [hereinafter 
PERSONA NON GRATA]. 
 151 VCDR, supra note 149, 23 U.S.T. at 3233–34, 500 U.N.T.S. at 102. 
 152 Id.; PERSONA NON GRATA, supra note 150, ¶¶ 10, 12. 
 153 VCDR, supra note 149, 23 U.S.T. at 3233–34, 500 U.N.T.S. at 102; PERSONA NON GRA-
TA, supra note 150, ¶ 12; VCDR, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L., supra note 146. 
 154 VCDR, supra note 149, 23 U.S.T. at 3234, 500 U.N.T.S. at 102; PERSONA NON GRATA, 
supra note 150, ¶¶ 12–13. Forty-eight hours is typically considered a reasonable time after which 
a diplomat declared “persona non grata” must leave the receiving state. PERSONA NON GRATA, 
supra note 150, ¶ 13. 
 155 Id. ¶ 5; see VCDR, supra note 149, 23 U.S.T. at 3233–34, 500 U.N.T.S. at 102 (providing 
that states may declare a diplomat “persona non grata” at any time and without explanation). 
 156 See BARKER, supra note 149, at 168 (showing that the right is not susceptible to abuse 
because states are strongly hesitant to declare diplomats “persona non grata,” likely because they 
fear retaliatory action); PERSONA NON GRATA, supra note 150, ¶ 14 (showing that the right is not 
susceptible to abuse because diplomats declared “persona non grata” are not “automatically dis-
missed” and “[i]t is incumbent upon the sending State to decide on the ensuing career of the agent 
concerned”). Although the declaration of “persona non grata” declaration is considered a powerful 
and controversial one, it is mainly the unwelcome diplomat that feels its effects, rather than the 
sending state’s government. See Bump, supra note 96; PERSONA NON GRATA, supra note 150, 
¶¶ 16–17. 
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ic mission such as embassies or consulates.157 The idea that diplomatic 
premises are protected is central to diplomatic law and was widely recog-
nized as early as the eighteenth century.158 In the VCDR, the premises of a 
diplomatic mission are expansively defined as “the buildings or parts of 
buildings and the land ancillary thereto, irrespective of ownership, used for 
the purposes of the mission including the residence of the head of the mis-
sion.”159 In particular, Article 22 of the VCDR plainly states that “[t]he 
premises of the mission shall be inviolable” and “their furnishings and other 
property thereon . . . shall be immune from search, requisition, attachment 
or execution.”160 Article 30 extends the same inviolability and protection 
granted to premises of diplomatic missions to a diplomatic agent’s private 
residence.161 The VCDR does not prescribe a punishment for a violation of 
its terms, other than that a state may expel diplomats and sever all diplomat-
ic relations with the offending state.162 The offended state has the option to 
appeal to the world’s primary judicial body—the International Court of Jus-
tice (ICJ). 163 States rarely pursue this option, however.164 The ICJ must 
agree to hear the case and have jurisdiction over the parties, which is not 
automatic. 165 Even if the ICJ hears the case and finds in the offended state’s 
favor, its decisions are often not adhered to and it lacks an effective en-
                                                                                                                           
 157 See VCDR, supra note 149, 23 U.S.T. at 3233–34, 3237, 500 U.N.T.S. at 102, 106 (recog-
nizing right to expel diplomats and heavily restricting interference with diplomatic premises); see 
also United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Judgment, 1980 I.C.J. 
Rep. 64, ¶ 62 (May 24) (recognizing the inviolability of diplomatic premises under the VCDR). 
 158 ERNEST MASON SATOW, SATOW’S DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE 101 (6th ed. 2009); JEAN 
D’ASPREMONT, PREMISES OF DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS, MAX PLANCK ENCY. OF PUB. INT’L L., ¶ 1 
[hereinafter PREMISES OF DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS]. 
 159 VCDR, supra note 149, 23 U.S.T. at 3231, 500 U.N.T.S. at 98. 
 160 Id. at 3237, 500 U.N.T.S. at 106. 
 161 Id. at 3240, 500 U.N.T.S. at 110. 
 162 See VCDR, supra note 149, 23 U.S.T. at 3233–34, 500 U.N.T.S. at 102 (permitting states 
to declare diplomats “persona non grata” and sever diplomatic relations). 
 163 David A. Koplow, Indisputable Violations: What Happens When the United States Unam-
biguously Breaches a Treaty?, 37 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 53, 54–55 (2013); see Tehran, 1980 
I.C.J. Rep., ¶¶ 62–63 (deciding case between Iran and United States regarding VCDR violations, 
including the inviolability of premises provision). 
 164 See Koplow, supra note 163, at 54–55 (noting that the ICJ resolves only two to three cases 
a year and it does not have automatic jurisdiction); S. Gozie Ogbodo, An Overview of the Chal-
lenges Facing the International Court of Justice in the 21st Century, 18 ANN. SURV. OF INT’L & 
COMP. L. 93, 107 (2012) (identifying that four out of five permanent Security Council members 
have rejected the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction, severely reducing its power and influence). 
 165 See Koplow, supra note 163, at 54–55 (noting that the ICJ does not have automatic juris-
diction over the United States, Russia, and other key international actors); Basis of the Court’s 
Jurisdiction, INT’L CT. OF JUST., http://www.icj-cij.org/en/basis-of-jurisdiction [http://perma.
cc/MH4T-DDFS] (identifying the ways in which the ICJ is granted jurisdictional authority, which 
are based on consent of the states involved in contentious proceedings). 
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forcement mechanism.166 Consequently, many international law violations 
go unpunished. 167 
D. The Legality of the U.S. Response to Russia’s Cyber Attack 
President Obama’s press release in conjunction with the December 29, 
2016 Executive Order referred to the measures taken against Russia in re-
sponse to its cyber attack on the DNC as “sanctions.”168 The United States, 
however, imposed the measures without support from the UN Security 
Council or other international organization and therefore do not qualify as 
sanctions under the two more restrictive definitions.169 Even under the 
broadest definition of sanctions as “any action against a State to compel it 
to obey international law or to punish it for a breach of international law,” 
the U.S. measures fall short.170 The Obama Administration did not state 
whether Russia’s cyber attack violated international law, only that it violat-
ed “established international norms of behavior.”171 This is not a distinction 
without a difference, as the term “international norms” does not indicate an 
international legal obligation.172 
                                                                                                                           
 166 See, e.g., Amuda-Kannike Abiodun et al., An Examination of the Enforcement of ICJ De-
cisions Through Regional Organizations and Specialized Agencies, 59 J.L. POL’Y & GLOBALIZA-
TION 21, 21 (2017) (stating that ICJ enforcement is inadequate); Aloysius P. Llamzon, Jurisdiction 
and Compliance in Recent Decisions of the International Court of Justice, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
815, 825–44 (detailing five recent instances of non-compliance with ICJ decisions). But see 
PHILIPPE COUVREUR, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 80 n.128 (2016) (noting that non-compliance with the ICJ’s decisions is “ex-
tremely rare” but acknowledging a number of cases of non-compliance); How the Court Works, 
INT’L CT. OF JUST., http://www.icj-cij.org/en/how-the-court-works [http://perma.cc/37DJ-D2EY] 
(explaining that it is rare for an ICJ decision to go unimplemented because cases have to be sub-
mitted and parties have to consent to jurisdiction). 
 167 See Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, On Compliance, 47 INT’L ORG. 175, 197–
201 (1993) (recognizing that the international legal system tolerates a lot of non-compliance); 
Koplow, supra note 163, at 54–55 (pointing out that treaty violations are often inconclusive). 
 168 Press Release, The White House, supra note 12. 
 169 See Exec. Order No. 13,757 (taking measures pursuant to U.S. law only); Ruys, supra note 
102, at 20–21 (identifying two more restrictive definitions of sanctions). 
 170 Ruys, supra note 102, at 19 (quoting Sanctions, supra note 122); see Goodman, supra note 
96 (recognizing that the question of whether Russia violated international law is irrelevant to deter-
mining the legality of the U.S. measures against Russia because they were retorsions); Patrick Tuck-
er, Did Russia’s Election Meddling Break International Law? Experts Can’t Agree, GOV’T EXEC. 
(Feb. 8, 2017), http://www.govexec.com/technology/2017/02/did-russias-election-meddling-break-
international-law-experts-cant-agree/135260/ [http://perma.cc/DW77-B7SA] (recognizing the U.S. 
expulsion of diplomats and economic measures as retorsions). 
 171 Press Release, The White House, supra note 12; Goodman, supra note 96. 
 172 Goodman, supra note 96; see Jelena Cupac, Emerging International Norms and State 
Behavior: Chinese Foreign Policy Between “Pluraist Pull” and “Solidarist Push,” 9 CEU POL. 
SCI. J. 39, 39–40 (recognizing international norms of behavior as “ingredients of international 
politics”). 
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In actuality, the United States largely executed its response to Russia 
pursuant to the doctrine of retorsions, unfriendly acts that do not violate the 
acting state’s international obligations.173 Although retorsions are the most 
unregulated mode of international response, the United States had numerous 
international legal obligations in responding to Russia’s cyber attack, in-
cluding the VCDR and the prohibition on imposing coercive economic 
measures without support from an international organization.174 Pursuant to 
Article 9 of the VCDR, the United States was undoubtedly permitted to de-
clare thirty-five Russian diplomats “personas non grata.”175 It is less clear, 
though, whether the United States acted consistently with its international 
obligations when closing two Russian compounds on U.S. territory and tak-
ing economic measures against certain Russian entities and individuals.176 
In regards to the U.S. closure of two Russian compounds, Article 22 of 
the VCDR prohibited it if the compounds were “premises of a mission.”177 
Media reports conflicted as to whether the two Russian compounds were 
mainly used as surveillance outposts for Russian spies or as vacation homes 
for Russian diplomats.178 Either way, the two compounds were reasonably 
considered protected premises under the VCDR.179 The VCDR defines 
“premises of the mission” quite broadly, extending it to any building and the 
land connected with it used for “the purposes of the mission.”180 In fact, 
records showed that at least one of the compounds received a partial tax 
                                                                                                                           
 173 Int’l Law Comm’n, Report on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, supra note 102, at 325; 
Goodman, supra note 96; Tucker, supra note 170. 
 174 Ruys, supra note 102, at 24; Doraev, supra note 133, at 376–77; GIEGERICH, supra note 
102, ¶ 1. 
 175 Bump, supra note 96; see VCDR, supra note 149, 23 U.S.T. at 3233–34, 500 U.N.T.S. at 
102 (establishing right to declare diplomats “personas non grata”). 
 176 See VCDR, supra note 149, 23 U.S.T. at 3237, 500 U.N.T.S. at 106 (recognizing inviola-
bility of premises of diplomatic missions); Doraev, supra note 133, at 376–77 (recognizing cus-
tomary international law prohibition on coercive, economic measures imposed unilaterally); Press 
Release, The White House, supra note 12 (announcing closure of two Russian compound on U.S. 
territory and economic measures against four Russian entities and five Russian individuals). 
 177 See VCDR, supra note 149, 23 U.S.T. at 3237, 500 U.N.T.S. at 106 (recognizing inviola-
bility of premises of diplomatic missions); Rezchikov et al., supra note 87 (quoting Professor 
Dmitry Labin of Moscow State Institute of International Relations as stating that the VCDR “es-
tablishes the immunity of a state and its property used for [diplomatic purposes]” and the U.S. 
seizure of the Russian compounds was “a blatant violation” of the VCDR). 
 178 See Diaz, supra note 86 (describing Russian compounds as quiet); Mazzetti & Schmidt, 
supra note 85 (describing Russian compounds as “luxurious waterfront compounds” used as “a 
retreat for Russian diplomats”); Windrem et al., supra note 86 (describing Russian compounds as 
“festooned with all manner of antenna for capturing communications” and having “clear electronic 
views of several critical U.S. facilities”). 
 179 See VCDR, supra note 149, 23 U.S.T. at 3231, 500 U.N.T.S. at 98 (defining “premises of 
the mission”); Rezchikov et al., supra note 87 (arguing that the Russian compounds were protect-
ed premises under the VCDR). 
 180 VCDR, supra note 149, 23 U.S.T. at 3231, 500 U.N.T.S. at 98. 
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exemption due to its status as a government embassy, which is typically 
considered a protected diplomatic premises under Article 22 of the 
VCDR.181 The VCDR does not define what constitutes “purposes of the 
mission” and does not expressly require that the premises be used solely for 
“purposes of the mission.”182 The phrase therefore arguably encompasses 
both surveillance and vacationing, and likely neither served as the sole pur-
pose of the Russian compounds.183 Alternatively, the Russian compounds 
could have been rendered inviolable under Article 30 because they were 
“[t]he private residence of a diplomatic agent,” which the VCDR also does 
not define.184 It was therefore highly likely that the United States acted con-
trary to its international law obligations under the VCDR in closing the two 
Russian compounds.185 
Similarly, the U.S. economic measures taken against Russia were in 
conflict with UN resolutions prohibiting the use of coercive, economic 
measures without UN authorization.186 The U.S. measures are reasonably 
deemed coercive to the extent that they were aimed at changing Russian 
policies, such as those regarding cyber surveillance.187 The United States 
                                                                                                                           
 181 Tehran, 1980 I.C.J. Rep., ¶ 19; Diaz, supra note 86. 
 182 See VCDR, supra note 149, 23 U.S.T. at 3231, 500 U.N.T.S. at 98 (neglecting to define 
“purposes of the mission”); PREMISES OF DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS, supra note 158, ¶ 17 (noting 
that conducting activities contrary to diplomatic missions, such as smuggling, on diplomatic prem-
ises does not affect inviolability). 
 183 See VCDR, supra note 149, 23 U.S.T. at 3231, 500 U.N.T.S. at 98 (neglecting to define 
“purposes of the mission”); PREMISES OF DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS, supra note 158, ¶ 17 (recogniz-
ing that diplomatic premises may be used for non-diplomatic purposes and remain inviolable); 
Diaz, supra note 86 (providing accounts of the Russian compounds as being used for surveillance 
and vacationing). “Purposes of the mission” in the VCDR could be construed to include vacation 
homes for diplomats because diplomatic missions often serve to maintain the sending state’s pres-
ence in that country. See VCDR, supra note 149, 23 U.S.T. at 3231, 500 U.N.T.S. at 98 (identify-
ing “functions of a diplomatic mission” as including “[r]epresenting the sending State in the re-
ceiving State”). Surveillance could also reasonably be considered a “purpose of the mission”; 
illicit or questionable activities do not impact the inviolability of the premises of a mission. PREM-
ISES OF DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS, supra note 158, ¶ 17. Also, even if vacationing and surveillance 
are not proper purposes, the VCDR does not specify that a property must be used solely for “pur-
poses of the mission” in order to be considered a “premises of a mission.” See VCDR, supra note 
149, 23 U.S.T. at 3231, 500 U.N.T.S. at 98. It is highly probable that the Russian diplomats also 
used the two compounds for some other purpose, such as for conducting negotiations in-person or 
over the phone. See Diaz, supra note 86. 
 184 Rezchikov et al., supra note 87; see VCDR, supra note 149, 23 U.S.T. at 3240, 500 
U.N.T.S. at 110 (neglecting to define “private residence of a diplomatic agent”). 
 185 Rezchikov et al., supra note 87; see VCDR, supra note 149, 23 U.S.T. at 3237, 500 
U.N.T.S. at 106 (recognizing inviolability of premises of diplomatic missions). 
 186 G.A. Res. 46/210, supra note 135; G.A. Res. 2131, supra note 135; Doraev, supra note 
133, at 376–77. 
 187 See Matthew Happold, Economic Sanctions and International Law: An Introduction in 
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (Matthew Happold & Paul Eden ed. 2016) 
(“[I]t is argued that all ‘coercive measures’ are unlawful; that is, measures which . . . seek[] to 
require the target State to change its policies on any matter within its domestic jurisdiction . . . .”); 
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and other countries, however, have routinely taken economic measures 
without authorization from the UN or another international organization, 
and were never concretely reprimanded.188 International practice therefore 
indicates that the U.S. economic measures were legal, but they were never-
theless contrary to several UN resolutions and the general trend in modern 
international law.189 
III. COMBATTING STATE-SPONSORED CYBER ATTACKS  
WITH A NEW CYBER TREATY 
There is not an international law that directly applied to Russia’s cyber 
attack on the DNC.190 Consequently, it was indeterminable whether Russia 
violated the law and the United States was extremely challenged to formu-
late a response consistent with international law.191 The United States ulti-
mately grounded its response in generic and anachronistic international law 
principles and thereby skirted the bounds of the law, if not violated it.192 
                                                                                                                           
John J.A. Burke, Economic Sanctions Against the Russian Federation are Illegal Under Public 
International Law, 3 RUSSIAN L. J. 126, 127 (2015) (arguing that the economic sanctions imposed 
on Russia for its annexation of Crimea were in violation of international law because they intend-
ed to cause change in Russia’s foreign policy). 
 188 See Doraev, supra note 133, at 388 (recognizing that U.S. use of economic measures may 
be justified by the Lotus principle because they are not affirmatively prohibited); PELLET & 
MIRON, supra note 120, ¶ 7 (stating that “[i]n a rather primitive legal order such as public interna-
tional law, with no centralized institutions to establish a violation of rules and ensure their en-
forcement, [use of unilateral sanctions] is mainly incumbent upon States”); see also Haass, supra 
note 145 (identifying consequences of U.S. economic sanctions to include, for example, “in-
creased economic distress on Haiti, triggering a dangerous and expensive exodus of people from 
Haiti to the United States” and increasing Pakistan’s dependence on a nuclear option as opposed 
to concrete reprimands from other countries or an international organization). 
 189 See G.A. Res. 46/210, supra note 135 (strongly discouraging unilateral, coercive economic 
measures); G.A. Res. 2131, supra note 135 (prohibiting unilateral, coercive economic measures); 
Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of its Thirty-First Session, U.N. Doc. A/34/10 (1979), re-
printed in [1979] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 121, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1979/Add.1 (Part 2) 
(allowing “for the trend in modern international law to reserve the term ‘sanction’ for reactive 
measures applied by virtue of a decision taken by an international organization following a breach 
of an international obligation”); Doraev, supra note 133, at 388 (recognizing that international 
practice considers U.S. unilateral, economic measures legal because they are not affirmatively 
prohibited). 
 190 Ido Kilovaty & Itamar Mann, Towards a Cyber-Security Treaty, JUST SECURITY (Aug. 3, 
2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/32268/cyber-security-treaty [http://perma.cc/U8XE-UE3T]; 
Miller et al., supra note 96; see Hathaway et al., supra note 94; Hollis, supra note 94, at 1037, 
1039–40; Sklerov, supra note 94. 
 191 Goodman, supra note 96; Miller et al., supra note 96. 
 192 See GIEGERICH, supra note 102, ¶ 1 (recognizing retorsions as an ancient remedy in inter-
national law); Goodman, supra note 96 (identifying U.S. use of retorsions in responding to Rus-
sia’s cyber attack on the DNC); PREMISES OF DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS, supra note 158, ¶ 1 (recog-
nizing that inviolability of diplomatic premises under the VCDR is an ancient principle of interna-
tional law); Rezchikov et al., supra note 87 (claiming that U.S. response to Russia’s cyber attack 
on the DNC violated the VCDR). 
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Even so, the U.S. measures were far from effective in punishing Russia and 
deterring future cyber attacks.193 As this Part argues, these issues emphasize 
the dire need for a new international treaty—one that specifically applies to 
state-sponsored cyber attacks, ensures detailed and unbiased investigations, 
sets forth a predetermined response, and provides an effective remedy.194 
This Part identifies three features the new cyber treaty needs to successfully 
combat future state-sponsored cyber attacks.195 Section A recommends that 
the treaty clearly and precisely define “state-sponsored cyber attack.”196 
Section B proposes that the treaty create an international cyber security 
council.197 Lastly, Section C advocates for a punishment provision.198 
A. Defining State-Sponsored Cyber Attacks 
The new international cyber treaty should explicitly prohibit states 
sponsored cyber attacks and provide a definition that is as clear and concise 
as possible.199 This definition would improve states’ ability to quickly and 
                                                                                                                           
 193 See Miller et al., supra note 96 (stating that President “Obama approved a modest package 
combining measures that had been drawn up to punish Russia for other issues . . . with economic 
sanctions so narrowly targeted that . . . their impact [w]as largely symbolic”); Sanger, supra note 
11 (stating that the U.S. measures against Russia were “not as biting as previous ones” and it is 
unclear what impact they will have except on the expelled diplomats); Rebecca Crootof, The DNC 
Hack Demonstrates the Need for Cyber-Specific Deterrents, LAWFARE (Jan. 9, 2017), https://
lawfareblog.com/dnc-hack-demonstrates-need-cyber-specific-deterrents [http://perma.cc/MY96-
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a swift condemnation of the attack. See Miller et al., supra note 96; Sanger, supra note 11; 
Crootof, supra. Second, the U.S. measures were not clearly aimed at a particular Russian act con-
nected with the DNC cyber attack and thus did not serve as a strong punishment or deterrent. See 
Miller et al., supra note 96; Sanger, supra note 11. Third, the United States already had numerous, 
highly burdensome sanctions in place against Russia for annexing Crimea in 2014; the new 
measures merely compounded these and were unlikely to encourage Russia to change its behavior. 
See Sanger, supra note 11. Fourth, the United States did not quickly provide adequate evidence to 
support its conclusion that Russia committed the cyber attack, thereby allowing Russia and Presi-
dent-elect Donald Trump to deny Russia’s involvement. See Miller et al., supra note 96; Sanger, 
supra note 11. 
 194 See Hathaway et al., supra note 94, at 877 (arguing for a new international cyber treaty); 
Kilovaty & Mann, supra note 190 (recognizing need for a new cyber treaty after Russia’s cyber 
attack on the DNC); infra notes 199–236 and accompanying text. 
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accurately determine when a state-sponsored cyber attack has occurred. 200 
It would also provide states with a defensible basis for relying on the trea-
ty’s provisions when executing a response.201 
One appropriate definition of “state-sponsored cyber attack” is “the 
unauthorized viewing or copying of data of another state by a government 
agent which is used for any purpose other than to inform government offi-
cials of national security threats.”202 This definition is broad enough to ac-
count for the sophisticated and innovative nature of state-sponsored cyber 
attacks.203 At the same time, it narrowly applies only to government agents’ 
actions rather than, for example, lone credit card data thieves, which are 
usually not impactful enough to warrant an international response.204 It also 
does not apply to government-executed, cyber espionage purely for national 
security purposes, such as a government agent tapping into a foreign terror-
ist cell’s computer network to determine whether they plan to attack that 
agent’s home state.205 Many countries, including the United States, Russia, 
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and copying of data files”); Hathaway et al., supra note 94, at 826 (defining cyber attack as “any 
action taken to undermine the functions of a computer network for a political or national security 
purpose”); Solis, supra note 24, at 3, quoting WILSON, supra note 24, at 12 (defining cyber terror-
ism as “unlawful attacks and threats of attack against computers, networks, and the information 
stored therein when done to intimidate or coerce a government or its people in furtherance of po-
litical or social objectives”). 
 203 See Hathaway et al., supra note 94, at 824 (recognizing the need for a definition of cyber 
attack that does not exclude the broad range of potential threats to national security); Hollis, supra 
note 94, at 1032–33 (advocating for a broad definition of information operations attacks to avoid 
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 204 See Hathaway et al., supra note 94, at 830–31 (arguing that cyber crimes not executed for 
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and China, routinely employ and heavily rely on cyber espionage activities 
to protect their citizenry.206 The new treaty would therefore be more likely 
to obtain ratifications and other forms of consent if it did not govern this 
conduct.207 A large number of ratifications is essential to the treaty’s success 
because, as with any treaty, it will only bind the states that consent to be 
bound to it.208 In other words, states that do not ratify or otherwise consent 
to the new cyber treaty will not be obligated under it to cease committing 
cyber attacks.209 The treaty especially needs to be ratified by states that are 
strongly suspected of perpetrating cyber attacks in the past, such as Russia 
and China, in order to strongly deter them from committing future at-
tacks.210 
B. Creating an International Cyber Security Council 
The new treaty should create an international cyber security council.211 
The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (“OPCW”) 
would serve as an appropriate model.212 The OPCW is an independent in-
ternational organization that was created by the Chemical Weapons Conven-
tion (“CWC”), a treaty that bans chemical weapons.213 The OPCW has vast 
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authority to enforce the CWC, such as by confirming that chemical weap-
ons are destroyed and recommending that member states impose sanctions 
on non-compliant states.214 Similarly, an international cyber security council 
should be an independent international organization with authority over the 
cyber treaty’s member states.215 It should also have expansive power to 
conduct investigations into suspected state-sponsored cyber attacks and to 
impose sanctions on perpetrators.216 The international cyber security council 
would thereby ensure that state-sponsored cyber attacks are swiftly identi-
fied, attributed to the perpetrating state, and punished appropriately. 217 
C. Punishing State-Sponsored Cyber Attacks 
The treaty should expressly authorize a punishment for state-sponsored 
cyber attacks.218 The treaty should not identify the precise punishment, even 
though that would eliminate state discretion and promote consistency in 
punishing state-sponsored cyber attacks. 219 Due to the varied and increas-
ingly sophisticated nature of state-sponsored cyber attacks, the punishment 
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needs to be flexible to ensure that it is proportional.220 Therefore, similar to 
the CWC, the cyber treaty should broadly authorize the international cyber 
security council to issue punitive action against the perpetrating state.221 
This punishment provision would significantly improve a victim state’s 
ability to obtain adequate recourse against the perpetrating state in the wake 
of a state-sponsored cyber attack.222 It would also deter states from perpe-
trating cyber attacks and ultimately reduce their occurrence.223 
This punishment provision, together with the definition and cyber secu-
rity council provisions, comprise a specific, comprehensive treaty to address 
state-sponsored cyber attacks.224 Drafting this treaty, obtaining the necessary 
support, and implementing the recommended provisions will likely be an ar-
duous process.225 Also, like any treaty, it is not guaranteed to be success-
ful. 226 Nevertheless, state-sponsored cyber attacks are wreaking havoc with 
increasing regularity and sophistication and a specific, comprehensive inter-
national cyber treaty is an imperative step towards combatting them.227 
CONCLUSION 
State-sponsored cyber attacks are a severe, global threat. Russia’s 
cyber attack on the DNC demonstrated that the current international legal 
framework is woefully inadequate for combatting this threat. The United 
States was forced to apply general and outdated international law principles. 
As a result, the United States may have violated those principles and issued 
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a response that was ill suited for its goals: to punish Russia and deter future 
cyber attacks. In the continued absence of legal reform, state-sponsored 
cyber attacks will continue to occur and grow in sophistication. 
In order to effectively combat against state-sponsored cyber attacks, 
countries should come together and negotiate a new, international treaty 
specifically tailored to the issue. This treaty should contain three provisions. 
First, it should identify a clear and comprehensive definition of “state-
sponsored cyber attack. Second, it should create an international cyber secu-
rity council. Third, it should expressly authorize a punishment for state-
sponsored cyber attacks. The treaty would thereby deter states from com-
mitting these attacks and provide an effective remedy when they occur. 
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